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This paper investigates the impact of food safety standards promulgated by governments or imposed 
by buyers from the private sector on the capacity of developing countries to access developed 
countries’ markets for high value agricultural and food products. I offer an analysis that disentangles 
productivity-sorting from quality-sorting in fresh fruits and vegetables exports. My theoretical model 
and empirical analysis confirms the importance of taking into consideration importers' preference for 
quality as well as exporters' capacity to produce quality products when analyzing average export unit 
prices of fresh fruits and vegetables. Thanks to a new database on U.S import refusals, my empirical 
analysis shows that a shock to reputation seems to have a downgrading effect, reducing the capacity of 
countries to export quality products. 
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1 Introduction 
In the debate over trade liberalization and development, part of the discussions about the 
access of developing countries agricultural products to developed countries markets switched 
from tariff issues to the effective capacity of developing countries to export their products. 
Living aside the debate over such export strategy for food scarce countries, Non Tariff 
Barriers (NTBs) and in particular Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures are today 
recognized as an important impediment to such trade. However, there is a pending question 
regarding impact of food safety standards promulgated by governments or imposed by buyers 
from the private sector. Their effects on the capacity for developing countries to access 
developed countries’ markets for high value agricultural and food products is a vivid research 
theme that up-till-now provided mixed results. While some advocates that food safety 
standards undeniably hamper exporting abilities, others present evidence that they can also 
stimulate and enable competitiveness (Jaffee and Hanson, 2005). 
There has been since the 80s an increasing interest in the promotion in developing 
countries for the production of Non-Traditional Agricultural Exports
2. On the one hand, 
governments and international development agencies thought they would be a good 
alternative in the context of the deterioration of conditions in international markets for 
traditional exports. On the other hand, the increasing demand for year round access to 
horticultural products in developed countries provided good grounds for supporting the 
development of such new market opportunities. But in conjunction with the increase of fresh 
fruits and vegetables (hereafter FF&V) imports from developing countries, the last two 
decades have witnessed and enhanced awareness of food safety issues in developed countries. 
While the latter have in reaction implemented a growing set of new regulations, the former 
had to align their production processes in order to secure their exports. Traditional trade 
                                                        
2 In opposition to traditional agricultural export crops like coffee or bananas.  
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barriers such as tariffs are less instigated to deal with this specific issue and so non-tariff 
measures flourished with the aim, conceptually at least, to satisfy a certain level of quality 
and safety of agricultural products.  
The increased use of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures toward agricultural 
products has been largely documented by the literature, and their impacts can be split in two 
different types of outcomes that are after all two sides of the same coin. First, so as to survive 
international competition, firms from developing countries must evolve and take full account 
of new regulations on food safety implemented in developed countries.
3 In particular, the 
demand for quality from consumers in developed countries is exerting increased pressure on 
producers from developing countries to transform their processes in order to be eligible to 
export. Eligibility is generally acquired through a certification procedure sanctioning the 
implementation of defined quality standards. Secondly, if a given producer qualifies for these 
standards, we can expect that there is a reputation effect that robustly ties the trade 
relationship over time. One of the central concerns in the literature is about the capacity of 
developing countries and in particular of smallholders to develop and sustain their exports to 
developed countries in such context of increasingly stringent food safety standards and the 
ever more frequent requirement for certification. However, standards should not necessarily 
be viewed as an impediment to trade and development for producers in developing countries. 
Some even argue that food safety standards can serve as a “catalyst for realizing pro-poor 
export-led growth in developing countries” (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006).  
Many studies analyse the effect of new SPS measures on predicted trade flows with an 
ex-ante approach (Otsuki et al 2001). Even though the conclusions of such ex-ante 
approaches could be nuanced in many ways, they nonetheless highlight the potential trade 
exclusion effect of those measures. Yet, too few studies adopt an ex-post analysis posture. 
                                                        
3 We make use of both terms producer and firm and use them as identical terms.    4
Such an approach was at the time rendered impossible because of the lack of data on the 
implementation of SPS measures in world trade.
.4 
In Europe, following various food scares and related events, public as well as private 
standards have been strengthened through new regulations along with the development of 
private certifications and codes of practice that are usually far more burdensome than public 
regulations. Private standards are still very much heterogeneous around the world and 
particularly in the two biggest destinations of developing countries’ FF&V exports, namely 
the US and the EU.  In this line, Jaffee and Masakure (2005) emphasize this heterogeneity 
between and within EU countries, along various distribution channels and market segments, 
according to consumer preferences but also to patterns of fresh product purchases and 
distribution. Supermarket chains in the UK generally require high standards and food safety 
compliance – in particular when considering the growing importance of pre-packs and other 
high care products – but other FF&V segments are governed by very different standards. 
Jaffee and Masakure (2005) take the examples of ethnic but also food services and restaurant 
supply chains for which the predominant consideration remains price and continuity. As for 
the US, even though supermarket chains tend to follow the same path as EU retailers, the 
supply of FF&V in bulk through brokers is still widely used (Hanson and Blandon, 2009). 
Moreover, there is no sign of a convergence process among supermarket chains as there has 
been in the EU with the EurepGAP followed by the GLOBALGAP certification process. 
Both heterogeneity and volatility of US supermarkets’ codes of practice is one other intricacy 
for developing country suppliers to develop and access what is referred to as “High Care” 
markets to the US. 
                                                        
4 Disdier et al. (2007) were able to conduct a study on the effect of Non Tariff Measures (NTBs) relying on WTO 
members’ notifications of SPS and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs). However, it has frequently been 
underlined that WTO members only have the obligation to notify changes to SPS measures since 1995. Thus 
WTO notifications are a good tool in order to consider changes in exporting countries SPS environment, but they 
can not be used as a strict proxy for an actual barrier level. Studies pinpoint the high level of aggregation of such a 
database and above all the lack of information concerning many important bilateral restrictions.   5
The increasing role of private standards in the EU, and to another extent in the US, along 
with the evolution of consumer demand, the reduction in transport costs and the subsequent 
increase in competition have triggered the development of new strategies among suppliers in 
developing countries. The case of Kenyan FF&V exporters is a very famous example of this 
adaptation to new market conditions (Jaffee and Masakure 2005). In the late 80’s, only 10% 
of the Kenyan French bean production was sold directly to supermarket chains in Europe. 
The rest was sold in bulk through wholesale markets or distributors. With the increase in 
competition in the European market because of the diversification of supplying origins and 
the subsequent downward pressure on wholesale prices, sales of loose products became 
marginally profitable. This has created an incentive for the pursuit of product innovation and 
quality. During the 90’s, even though export quantities did not increase much, export value 
grew along with the proportion of pre-packed products directly exported to supermarkets. 
This export strategy intensified during the following decade with the development and 
diversification of such pre-packs including semi-processed “high-care” products such as 
mixed salads, and assortments of cut vegetables produced under highly severe hygienic 
conditions. According to Jaffee and Masakure (2005), this shift of strategy toward value-
added processing and packaging allowed for a three-fold increase of Kenya’s export value, 
from 1000 US$ per ton in the early 1990s to 3000 US$ per ton. Even though trade in bulk 
still represents an important component of Kenyan exports in order to cover their costs, this 
shift provides further evidence of the need to satisfy consumers’ need for increased value-
added agricultural products and their willingness to pay a premium. Peru is another well 
known example. Even though the country benefits form favourable conditions for the 
production of winter vegetables for export to high income countries, high transport costs 
prevented any price competition with other suppliers. Thus they adopted a high quality 
strategy that not only allowed them to become competitive in such markets but also generated   6
increased “client loyalty”. Such strategy reduced the risk of trade disruptions due to erratic 
and irregular quality. In other words, this trend created good reputation.  
These observations support the hypotheses of this paper that not only quality but also 
reputation is a determinant of the pattern of FF&V exports. Quality, captured in this paper by 
prices, has two dimensions. Firstly, I assume two levels of quality, roughly relying on this 
differentiation between bulk exports – for which a buyer/consumer’s prime concern will be 
set on prices – and high care products – for which a buyer’s prime concern will be set on 
safety, reliability and value-added attributes. Secondly, I introduce a reputation parameter 
that will impact the whole country’s export sector, whether firms export in bulk or high care 
products. This echoes the notion of reputation highlighted by the case of Peru.  
One crucial aspect of the paper is thus to provide grounds for the fact that agricultural 
products are much like industrial products in the way that consumers are looking for quality 
and safety and that producers must adapt to these needs. It also inquires whether preferences 
for quality on the one side and reputation effects on the other are upholding the capacity of 
producers of agricultural products in developing countries to export to developed countries. 
As such, this paper is a contribution to the recent literature on the relationship between 
quality and trade. Therefore, this paper will address the question of the sensitivity of FF&V 
exports to both quality and reputation shocks. Its novelty lies in emphasizing the need to 
consider the reputation effect of producing quality. This notion is discussed in the next 
section. In the third section I empirically investigate a simple productivity sorting model of 
FF&V exports. The fourth section develops a new framework that endogenizes quality and 
allows for both quality sorting and productivity sorting of exports in the same export market. 
The corollary is that it allows for firms to produce according to either productivity sorting or 
quality sorting. This framework integrates heterogeneity in the capacity exporting countries 
to produce quality and in consumers’ preference for quality and moreover introduces the 
existence of a reputation effect. Section five looks at the empirical analysis of that model by   7
making use of a new dataset on import refusals. Section six sets out conclusions and potential 
policy implications.  
 
2  Alerts and the notion of reputation 
Experience of Guatemala and the Dominican Republic 
Usually, as little as 1% of food import shipments are inspected by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) at the port of entry (Buzby et al. ,2008).  But if a product or an 
exporter (country or firms) repeatedly violates US regulations or poses risks in terms of SPS 
issues, the FDA will raise the level of surveillance, creating an “Alert” and implementing an 
“Automatic Detention” (AD) or a “Detention Without Physical Evidence” (DWPE) system. 
As a consequence, products for which an alert is implemented are subject to scrutiny at the 
border. This system of AD and DWPE has first been implemented in the late 80s. This period 
witnessed simultaneously an increase in imports of horticultural products in the US market 
and rising food safety concerns on the part of US consumers and authorities. Thus, aside from 
detentions due to different pest outbreaks, the increasing attentiveness to food safety and in 
particular to pesticide residues led to the implementation of AD and alerts for various 
countries and products for which many violations had been observed.  
In the case of an alert, the surveillance of products is increased by compulsory detention 
and the burden of proof that the shipment is compliant is transferred to the exporter. This has 
created delays in the US market and new risks for the importer distribution chain. Under 
DWPE, exporters that are able to send products complying with the US legislation five times 
in a row (re)gain access without automatic detention. However, exporters continue to be 
submitted to a higher level of potential controls. This sequence of controls illustrates the 
importance of earnestness in order to ensure a continuous capacity to export over time. As 
Baylis et al. (2009) point out; the limited resources of the FDA can lead inspections to be 
path dependant, by continuously focusing on products and/or producers that encountered   8
problems in the past. Thus, it seems fair to say that a newcomer in the exporter community 
faces lower probability of refusals. Along this line, Buzby et al (2008), confirmed the 
existence a strong correlation between refusals and FDA alerts. FDA inspections and as a 
consequence refusals are clearly biased against exporters or countries holding a record of risk 
of their food exports 
Different case-studies in Central America have emphasized the immediate effects of such 
regulations on trade flows and the risk of market disruption of which Guatemala and the 
Dominican Republic are two famous examples. The introduction of NTAXs – non-traditional 
agricultural export crop
5 – in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala brought new 
production technologies and new demands of aesthetic and grade qualities that resulted in an 
intensive use of chemical inputs. At first, these aesthetic requirements, as a “Search” attribute 
of quality, did not present specific information asymmetry issues. A survey among 
participants in the US snow pea market indeed emphasized that Guatemalan smallholder 
production, compared to large estate production in Mexico or in California, was much better 
matched with the demand from US consumers (Julian, 2003). Along with the increased 
awareness of food safety issues in the US from the end of the 80s, the massive use of 
pesticides resulted in frequent shipment detention and refusals by US customs authorities 
(FDA). The intensification of production and the overuse of pesticides also led to 
phytosanitary crises causing temporary export bans6. During the same decade, the 
Dominican Republic was among the first providers to the US market for some FF&V like 
snow peas, eggplant or cantaloupe. But in 1987/1988, the FDA issued a countrywide alert for 
pesticide residues. As the Dominican Republic was struggling with these new issues, 
Guatemala was entering the NTAXs sector and rapidly replaced the Dominican Republic as 
the leading provider for some of those FF&V. However, Guatemala rapidly met the same fate 
                                                        
5 In opposition to traditional agricultural export crops like coffee or bananas.  
6 This was the case for Guatemalan snow peas in 1995   9
as the Dominican Republic, and was submitted to a countrywide alert in 1992. According to 
Thrupp (1995), in the early 90s, 27.3 % of NTAXs shipments sampled from Guatemala were 
detained. Between 1990 and 1994, 3,081 detentions of Guatemala's exports due to pesticide 
residues resulted in a loss of a total of $17,686,000. This situation and the inability to address 
SPS concerns have been highly detrimental to Guatemala’s relative competitive position in 
the field of NTAXs.7 The sector was only in its infancy and some productions could not 
recover from such a shock. Yet, although the Guatemalan raspberry export market had been 
completely disrupted following a cyclospora outbreak crisis, the snow peas chain survived the 
pesticides and pest outbreak crises, and in 2002 it regained its 1991 pre-crisis export volume. 
Both Guatemala and the Dominican Republic are still today under countrywide alerts with 
DWPE for some of their most successful non-traditional agricultural export crops. While 
Guatemala is the main provider of snow peas to the US market, all these issues have 
decreased Guatemalan competitiveness in the US market compared to its two biggest rivals, 
Mexico and more recently Peru. Producers in both countries sell their production directly to 
the food distribution chain whereas 80% of Guatemalan snow peas are sold through brokers 
for half price (Hanson and Blandon, 2007). Between 2000 and 2006, average export unit 
prices were 0.50 US$/kg to 0.70 US$/kg for Guatemala, compared to 1.20$/kg to 1.90$/kg 
for Mexico and Peru.
8 
The notion of reputation and its measurement 
The evolution from bulk FF&V trade to trade in high care products sold directly to 
supermarkets changed the relationship between exporters and importers. Studies on food 
scares and crises clearly highlighted an impact of such events on the whole sector. For 
example, Jaud et al (2009) link food scares and supplier concentration in the EU market. 
                                                        
7 Guatemalan imports of fresh berries were also banned for the 1998 season and restored entry in 1999 because of 
suspicion of cyclospora outbreak (bacteria). 
8 NBER trade database, Authors’ own calculation   10
Using a new database quite similar in structure to the one used here for the US, they show 
that EU agro-food imports are vulnerable to food alerts in the EU market and that those 
imports are more concentrated on a few suppliers for what they define as risky products. 
However, it would be expected that high care products would reduce the risks of trade 
disruption due to quality, food safety or disease issues. But what would happen if the 
reputation parameter is not firm-specific but relates to the history of food scares between two 
trading countries? The definition of reputation that is used in this paper draws from Tirole 
(1996) who defines a collective reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations. Thereby, 
the consumer uses the past behaviour of the member’s group to predict the individual firm's 
future behaviour. As such, reputation is assumed to impact export value in various ways. 
First, there is path dependency between the potential history of food safety crises related to 
one country’s exports and import refusals. Second, even though over time one firm could 
have built a relationship of trust with a buyer, it is the collective reputation of the exporting 
country’s firms in one sector that will influence consumers’ rating of the product. 
Alerts are known to be highly correlated with the probability of a shipment being 
detained and to import refusals in the US. Remarkably, customs authorities do not recognize 
private certifications, thus the probability for one exporter to be detained by customs 
authorities – all things being equal – is the same whether the firm exports high-care products 
or not. This higher probability that shipments will be controlled and detained will have an 
impact on the reliability of exporters and thus on their reputation. 
In order to test the effect of reputation, this paper makes use of a new FF&V refusal 
dataset built upon information provided by the FDA. Our hypothesis is that the existence of 
an import alert due to a history of food crises affecting a product from a given country will 
have a reputation effect on every exporter from that country for that specific product. 
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3    Disentangling the drivers of trade in horticultural products 
New trade models of firm heterogeneity confirm the importance of differences of 
productivities among producers. Across-firm productivity levels explain a significant 
proportion of the variance of trade flows (Melitz, 2003). However, Schott (2004), in a study 
of US import data, highlighted the inconsistency of new trade theory models considering an 
inverse relationship between price and producer productivity. His study presents a strong 
relationship between GDP per capita and average export unit value within products at the 
HS10 level. Hummels and Klenow (2005) confirm this prediction and show that richer 
countries export more units at higher prices to a given market. These results are consistent 
with the observation that higher income countries produce products of higher quality. Both 
papers underline the importance of other source country characteristics and correlate such an 
increase in unit value with the exporter’s relative endowment of physical and human capital. 
Focusing on the demand side, Hallack (2006) finds that richer countries tend to benefit from 
higher demand for imports from countries producing high quality goods.  
In order to explain these observations, studies following the Melitz (2003) benchmark 
model offer specific deviations and include a quality factor of trade. Johnson (2009), Baldwin 
& Harrigan (2009) and Crozet, Head & Mayer (2009) test a quality-sorting hypothesis on 
various sectors and confirm the inconsistency of price behaviour with the benchmark models 
in particular sectors. These papers theoretically and empirically demonstrate the importance 
of taking quality into consideration when explaining bilateral trade flows, although most of 
them did not provide clear-cut disentangled impacts between quality-sorting on the one hand 
and productivity-sorting on the other.  
  It is usually assumed that agricultural trade, presented as commodity trade, tends to 
follow productivity sorting patterns (Johnson, 2009). In other words, we should observe an 
inverse relationship between price and distance between trade partners. My hypothesis in this   12
paper is that it is not necessarily the case when it comes to horticultural products. In order to 
demonstrate this, I first test in this section the usual productivity sorting model.  
Following heterogeneous firms trade models based on Melitz (2003), cut-off conditions 
on the incentive to export set a productivity threshold above which only the most productive 
producers should be able to export to distant markets. In this framework, f.o.b export prices 
are inversely related to distance and to the difficulty to enter one’s market. This impediment 
is generally revealed by fixed costs. The Melitz model and its extension by Helpman et al 
(2007) is now widely accepted. A technical appendix describes the main features of this 
model. In what follows, I will test the workhorse model based on Melitz (2003) and its 
application to average f.o.b. export prices in FF&V exports. The model introduces fixed and 
variable export costs in a framework of asymmetric countries and firm heterogeneity with 
firm productivity following a Pareto distribution.  
Average fob price in the productivity sorting setting 
As usual, I consider a world of C countries indexed by i, varying in size and location, in 
which consumers maximize a CES utility across a continuum of varieties over the set V 
available in country i. I assume the budget constraint of country i with the income Yi equals 
its expenditure and define Pi as the CES price index in country i.  
As usual in the literature, the supply-side is characterized by a Dixit-Stiglitz framework of 
monopolistic competition. A single firm produces each variety and there is free entry into the 
industry. Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity in the sense that marginal cost varies 
across firms using the same technology. Firms’ productivity is distributed Pareto, with the 
distribution function   g  over   , 0   and a continuous cumulative distribution   G . 
Firms from country i will incur fixed costs  ij f  of selling to a market j. 
The country specific factor cost is denoted by  i w and   / 1  c  is the firm’s specific factor 
requirement, or the inverse of its productivity, needed to produce one unit of the variety v. If   13
a firm from country i seeks to sell its products to consumers in country j, those consumers 
will bear an additional transport cost  ij  defined in a Samuelson’s iceberg costs fashion.  
The empirical setting of the model is set forth in equation (1) where expected f.o.b price of 
exports  ij p
 
from country i to country j depends positively on export market size and 
negatively on fixed and variable costs. The expected average price of exports from i to j, can 
now be expressed in log-linear form as:  
           ij ij j j i ij f y p w p      ln ln 1 1 1 1 ln 1 ln ln             (1) 
where lowercase variables represent the natural logarithms of their respective uppercase 
variables. As in Helpman et al. (2008) and Johnson (2009), I parameterize the bilateral fixed 
and variable costs as follows. I assume that  ij   (variable trade costs) is stochastic due to i.i.d. 
un-measured trade friction  ij u1  which is country-pair specific. As an analogy to their 
definition, I define
ij u
ij ij e D
 
  1 where  ij D1  represents bilateral symmetric distance between i 
and j with  
2 , 0 u ij N u   . Thus I have that  ij ij ij u d 1 1 ln     . Fixed trade costs, are 
classically set as  ij ij j i ij u D f 2 2 ln        . This data is defined in dyadic form by 
interacting indicators for the exporting and importing country. I assume that fixed trade costs 
rely on  i   and  j   respectively the exporter and importer fixed effects.  ij D2  is a set of 
overlapping data that I assume will decrease the fixed cost of exporting from country i to 
country j (common language, sharing a frontier; a free trade agreement, etc.), and  ij u2  stands 
for the unobserved variations in trade costs. In what follows I simplify the number of 
variables through the linear combination  ij ij ij u u 2 1     of unobserved variations in fixed 
and variable costs of trade that I assume to be normally distributed, with 
2
   the variance of 
the composite error. To be thorough, all variables of the model ought to be divided by the 
variance of this normal distribution. However, I do not compute this calculation in this paper;   14
I focus on the signs of the right and left hand side. Substituting those parameters back into the 
log-linear expression (1) of the expected f.o.b. price on the export market yields the following 
expression: 
ij ij ij j i ij D d p             2 1 0 ln     (2) 
 
Where    1 ln 0       is the constant,     i i i w    1 1 ln     and 
    j j j j y p     1 1 1 1       are respectively exporter and importer fixed effects. 
Our panel econometric test introduces a time dimension. Some variables, such as income, 
will become time-dependant. Hence, some variables can be transformed as 
  j j j p    1 1    . The log-linearized expected average price equation becomes: 
    ijt ijt ij jt j i ijt D d y p                2 1 0 1 1 ln    (3) 
Data and Empirical results 
In order to test the productivity-sorting hypothesis, I make use of CEPII BACI trade data on 
FF&V at the HS 6-digit level for the 1998-2007 period. It reconciles bilateral trade flows 
reported by exporter (f.o.b) and importer (c.i.f) in the UN-COMTRADE trade database. This 
dataset not only includes trade in quantity but also its equivalent trade value. With this, I 
compute the average unit f.o.b. trade value. This calculation and the comparison are made 
easier since I only consider FF&V trade, which are systematically reported in kilograms. 
BACI is the only database providing consistent unit-values at the world and product level, so 
it is particularly well suited to analyzing international trade prices (Gaulier and Zignago, 
2009)
9 .I have a balanced dataset covering 10 years, 221 countries and 102 FF&V products. 
The classic variables of distance and GDP were respectively retrieved from the CEPII 
database and from WDI’s World Bank online website. 
                                                        
9 As in Baldwin & Harrigan (2009), I remove traded quantities inferior to 500 kg because analysis of the data 
provide evidence that low trade levels usually present very high unit prices. These values are expected to bias 
considerably our results. The test gathers observed positive trade values since I are only interested in unit prices.   15
I first implement a “Gravity as usual” specification in order to check for the relevance 
of applying a gravity model to the FF&V sector. Table 1 provides results from this empirical 
investigation. It provides results that follow what is expected from a classic gravity 
specification on export values of agricultural products. Particularly, both importer and 
exporter GDPs are positively related to export values. Their respective point estimates are 
close to what the literature usually provides (Disdier et al. 2007 and Grant & Lambert 2008). 
However, it should be highlighted that the elasticity associated with the importer’s GDP is 
more than four times higher than the elasticity on the exporter’s GDP. As is common in the 
literature, I also test the model by replacing GDP with GDP per capita of both the exporting 
and the importing countries. Results are of the same order of magnitude as those obtained 
when computing GDPs.
10  
In a second stage, I test whether the productivity setting provides an explanation for 
the observed average unit export f.o.b price. Results of this test on prices are presented in 
Table 3. They display a positive relationship between average unit f.o.b export prices and 
distance when a negative relationship is expected in a productivity-sorting framework. This 
result supports the rejection of the hypothesis of homogenous quality among firms within the 
FF&V sector. Thus a comprehensive heterogeneous firm trade model should also include 
space for a heterogeneous quality sorting setting. Such expectations have already been 
highlighted by various papers using quality-sorting models. However, earlier studies did not 
focus specifically on the FF&V sector. Indeed, non-manufactured sectors are usually left out 
of such tests on the assumption that they are commodity products. One of the novelties of 
this paper is to provide proof that agricultural products are much like industrial products 
when it comes to sorting out quality and productivity influences in both consumption and 
production patterns. As with the “Gravity as usual” setting, I test the same specification 
replacing importer GDP by GDP per capita. I observe the same kind of results as in the first 
                                                        
10 Table 3 is presenting the correlation between GDP and GDP per capita for exporting and importing countries.    16
tests on export values. Replacing GDP with GDP per capita slightly increases the elasticities 
but does not change the results. Since distance is positively related to average unit price, it is 
not surprising that sharing a frontier has a negative impact. Sharing a common language is 
also negatively related to average unit prices, but having a history of colonial ties has a 
positive impact on prices.  
 
4  Quality and reputation matters 
In this section of the paper, I adopt the Melitz (2003) framework, augmented by Eaton, 
Kortun and Kramarz (2008), Baldwin and Harrigan (2009), Johnson (2009), and Crozet, 
Head and Mayer (2009), in order to build a quality sorting model based on firm heterogeneity 
with firm productivity following a Pareto distribution.  
This paper is considered as innovative with respect to the existing literature for introducing 
two key features. First, it allows for the possibility that firms produce according to either 
productivity sorting or quality sorting. Second, consumers from different countries have 
heterogeneous preferences for quality. Within a CES framework, I adopt a similar method to 
Johnson (2009), Baldwin and Harrigan (2009) and Crozet et al (2009), adding a quality 
parameter that allows for consumers to maximize their utility according to a quality-adjusted 
price.  
Productivity vs. Quality sorting models 
Many papers have developed quality adjusted models in order to explain the empirical 
evidence of increasing prices with distance between any two trading partners. Therefore, 
most of these models switch from a productivity-sorting to a quality-sorting setting, by 
hypothesizing that producing quality is costly. In such models, heterogeneity in productivity 
is therefore replaced by heterogeneity in quality. Indeed, the objective of these models is to 
introduce quality heterogeneity between firms without multiplying sources of heterogeneity   17
in order to keep the model tractable. Thus, one of the difficulties raised by quality-sorting 
models is to define a relationship between firm productivity and quality without loosing the 
possibility of comparison with the original Melitz productivity sorting-model. Hence, those 
models generally relate quality and productivity through a power function of the type 
 c q with  q the quality parameter, c firms’ factor requirement and  1   . Kugler and 
Verhoogen (2008) studying unit values of inputs of Colombian manufacturing plants provide 
direct empirical support for such a relationship between quality and cost showing that higher 
cost inputs are systematically associated with higher quality outputs. The general setting then 
usually defines a quality-adjusted price  q p p  ~  and a quality adjusted demand xq x  ~ . 
With this, the difficulty lies in the definition and proper setting of the power parameter  . 
The model developed in this section will not depart from these hypotheses. However, I 
innovate by endogenizing this power parameter, making this relationship idiosyncratic to the 
dyadic relationship between the exporting and importing country.  
According to the usual definition of the quality parameter, quality depends directly on 
the level of productivity of the firm and of the power parameter. The consequence will be 
first that depending on the value of the power parameter, all exporting firms from one country 
i will either export under productivity-sorting or quality-sorting. Baldwin & Harrigan (2009) 
define this power parameter as the elasticity connecting quality and factor requirements. 
Thus, setting   0 reduces the model to the standard Melitz (2003) productivity-sorting 
model (described in the technical appendix). And, if  1 0    , the quality-adjusted price 
increases with cost and thus unit price. It is only when  1    that the quality-adjusted price 
will be negatively related to unit price, meaning that the more factor requirement is needed to 
produce one unit of product, the higher the quality and the lower the quality adjusted price.  
The relationship is integrated in the consumer quality adjusted demand. Based on a firm’s 
factor requirement, consumers will regard some varieties as superior to others in terms of 
quality if and only if  1   . In such a setting, quality-sorting models fully reverse the   18
relationship between variable costs and prices: the more difficult the access to one country’s 
market, the higher both quality and average export prices are. Therefore, firms are sorted 
according to quality with the higher firm’s factor requirement representing the higher quality. 
As in Baldwin and Harrigan (2009), in quality-sorting settings, firm heterogeneity is 
distributed Pareto over factor requirements instead of productivity. Even though this 
complete inversion of the relationship fits much better with the average observed export 
prices, I argue that it still does not allow for considering the full reality of some sectors such 
as the FF&V export sector.  
For this reason, Johnson (2009) builds a framework allowing for close identification 
of the sign of the correlation between quality-adjusted price and unit price among various 
sectors. He is therefore able to identify if these exporting sectors follow a productivity-sorting 
or a quality-sorting setting. Borrowing from John Sutton’s terminology, Johnson (2009) 
proposes to link firms’ factor requirements to their capability defined by the ratio of quality to 
costs. This capability can be compared to a quality adjusted factor requirement. Firm 
heterogeneity does not rely on their factor requirement, but on their capacity to transform 
variable costs into quality. Thus firm’s quality is a constant elasticity function of their 
capability. His methodology makes it possible to identify empirically if the power parameter 
governing the relationship between quality and capability is  1    or  1   . As I have 
already defined, those two solutions respectively relate to the solutions where export prices 
are increasing or decreasing in the threshold, indicating if exports are following productivity 
or quality sorting. His results are of tremendous interest for various reasons: he builds and 
test a theoretical framework that clearly supports the rejection of the homogeneous quality 
formulation of the heterogeneous firms models, but also, he clearly states the existence of 
both productivity and quality sorting throughout the various sectors he is studying. 
Unfortunately, his results are not of any support concerning the sector of FF&V since 
Johnson (2009) discarded non-manufacturing trade of his sample “on the ground that   19
monopolistic competition models ought to be best suited to understand trade in differentiated 
manufactures”.  
In the model I suggest an in-between solution that would better fit the FF&V sector 
and would allow highlighting the effect of reputation on exports of FF&V. Instead of a 
continuous relationship between quality and productivity, I consider the existence of one 
level of quality. The model will introduce a quality threshold, idiosyncratic to the dyad, 
defined over the lower productivity level necessary to profitably export quality products. In 
other words, it relates to the level of productivity from which it becomes profitable for one 
exporter of country i to export quality products to country j according to consumers of 
country j’s preference for quality. I also endogenize the power parameter relating quality to 
productivity i  , making it idiosyncratic to the exporting country. This parameter characterizes 
the capacity  i  1  of the exporting country to produce quality. As a consequence, the level of 
productivity necessary to make quality profitable in one export market will depend on the 
exporter’s capacity to produce quality. Indeed, it will be much easier to produce quality 
FF&V fulfilling the basic quality requirements in France than in Guatemala. Also, the 
endogenization of the quality parameter to the importing country will enable products from 
the same sector within one exporting country to be exported under various “sorting” regimes 
according to the country of destination. Thus, I expect more quality products to be exported 
to high income countries when “productivity” products will better fit exports toward 
developing countries.   
For example, in the FF&V sector, I could differentiate what I call productivity and 
quality products according to the type of market chain through which those products enter the 
importing country. Productivity products relate to commodities, sold to intermediaries. The 
objective is to sell a high quantity of products and more productive firms are more profitable. 
Quality products relate to products for which the information on quality is made available 
through signals like certification.    20
Thus I consider in this model that firms are heterogeneous in their level of productivity that 
will then define, according to the targeted market, if it is profitable to export either 
productivity or quality products. I assume here that each firm with a level of productivity 
higher than the quality threshold will automatically switch to quality products.  
The setting: disentangling productivity and quality sorting 
The consumer’s problem 
As in the benchmark productivity model (see technical appendix), I consider a world of C 
countries indexed by i, varying in size and location, in which consumers maximize a CES 
utility function across a continuum of varieties over the set of Vi varieties available in 
country i. I assume consumers will be able to recognize “quality” from “productivity” 
products. Heterogeneity among consumers of various countries will rely on the intensity of 
consumers’ preference for quality. I define q i the quality parameter specific to consumers in 
country i. Like in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008), I introduce the term  i v   
representing an endogenous shock to the quality parameter specific to variety v in country i. 
This parameter will represent the reputation parameter. For “productivity” products, the 
quality term becomes   1  v q v i i  .  
The consumer maximizes utility according to a quality-adjusted demand 


















i i dv v x U      (4) 
The parameter  is the elasticity of substitution across products and as usual, it is the same 
across countries.
11 Given the budget constraint in country i and assuming country i’s income 
                                                        
11 Melitz and Ottavianio (2008) relaxed this hypothesis by developing a model in which each firm faces a linear 
demand. This model allows for mark-up variations across firms and destination markets. Their conclusions will be 
discussed further in this paper.    21
being equal to its expenditure i i i L w Y  , with Li the consumers’ supply of labour to firms and 
wi their wage, the consumption is given by: 
˜  x  i v   ˜  p  i v  
 ˜  P  i
 1Yi      ( 5 )  
where  ˜  p  i v  
pi v  
i v  qi











i V v i i dv v p P  the price 
index. This allows us to define a physical demand quite similar to Johnson (2009) with: 
 
      i i i i i i Y P v p q v v x
1 1 ~    
         (6) 
 
The producer’s problem 
As usual in the literature, I assume quality products to be costlier and that the cost of 
producing quality is a power function of a firm’s factor requirement. As in the benchmark 
model, I thus define c the factor requirement necessary to produce one unit of productivity 
products and cq the physical factor requirement necessary to produce one unit of quality 
product withcq c
1i  . The parameter  i  defined over    , 0 is idiosyncratic to country i and 
relates to the capacity  i  1 to produce quality. Firms maximize their profits at mill prices. 
Whether they produce productivity or quality products, the mill price is respectively   
    c w v p i i 1    
 
and      
  i c w v p i i
  
  
1 1 . Following the benchmark setting, 
firm productivity  c / 1   is distributed Pareto over    , 0  . The cumulative distribution 
function G    describes the distribution of productivity. Thus the capacity of a given firm to 
produce quality will depend of the interaction of three parameters:  
‐  The firm’s productivity: the higher a firm’s productivity, the more likely it will produce a 
quality product. 
‐  The country’s capacity to produce quality: the higher this capacity denoted by  1  i  , the 
lower the additional costs of producing quality will be.    22
‐  The intensity of consumers’ preference for quality. The more one country’s consumers 
find utility in consuming quality products, the more firms will be prompt to switch to a 
quality strategy.  
Thus the quality threshold is reflected by the upper limit level of factor requirement c  
for which it is profitable to switch to a quality strategy. This threshold corresponds to the 
specific productivity level for which      v p v p i i
~   implying   
i c q v i i
   .  This allows us 
to define a quality-adjusted price such that: 
       c w v p i i












~  represents the quality-adjusted factor requirement. I observe that 
c c c c      if    ~  and  c c c c      if    ~ . Every firm with a factor requirement c  c  will have a 
quality-adjusted price  ˜  p  i v   p i v   and thus will find an advantage in switching from 
productivity to quality products. Firms from country i will incur fixed costs f ij of selling to a 
market j. I consider that this fixed cost is the same whether the firm decides to produce under 
quality or productivity strategy. I assume that.  fii  0.
12 A firm will export to country j if and 
only if  ij  0 with  ij 
Rij

 fij . Where a firm’s revenues from selling to country j are: 
Rij  pij v  x j v   ijpi v   
1
 j v  qj v   
 1
Pj
 1Yj (7) 
The cut-off condition for a firm to export productivity products is the same as in the 
benchmark model. If ij ij ij c c c c   ~  then  , at the cut-off, firms will not find any advantage in 
producing under a quality strategy. Under this condition, the quality strategy will not increase 
the number of firms able to export to j.  However, a specificity of our model lies in the 
extreme case where all firms export under quality-sorting. In this situation, cij  c  and 
                                                        
12 A further version of this paper will introduce fixed costs of producing quality because consumers requirement 
for certification.     23
˜  c  ij  cij. Therefore, around the cut-off, some firms that would not have been able to export to 
j under productivity-sorting will however be able to export under quality-sorting. In other 
words, the possibility to switch to quality production will enable firms with a factor 
requirement c such that  ij ij ij c c c c c     ~ ~  to export to j. For convenience, I focus on a 
benchmark case for which  c cij   implying that both productivity and quality products will 
be exported. Other cases are extreme situations. In our benchmark situation – all other things 
being equal – the number of exporting firms to one country will be constant and will only be 
dependant of the entry threshold. The average f.o.b. price of one country i exporting to one 
importing market depends on the proportion of the number of productivity vs. quality firms 
exporting to this market. The expected price conditional on exporting from country i to 
country j is defined as: 
   ij i ij ij V p E     1 0     with    ijq ijp ij V V V      (8) 
As in Helpman et al (2008),  ijp V and  ijq V  are two monotonic functions of the proportion of 
exporters respectively exporting under productivity or quality strategy to country j,  ) (c G  
 ijp V
      
1
1 G ˜  c  ij 
c 
c 
cij  dG (c)                for  c ij  c  c 
0                                                Otherwise
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 ijq V
       

Otherwise                                                           0















As already mentioned, I do not consider extreme cases for which there is only productivity or 
quality sorting on the importing market, implying a change in the number of exporting firms 
to market j. Nevertheless, we can verify that our benchmark situation lies between those two 
extremes, within a framework of a constant number of exporting firms. The two extreme   24
values of this benchmark situation for  ij V are:  max , ijp V  for which all firms with a factor 
requirement  c  c ij export under productivity sorting and  max , ijq V for which all firms export 























We verify that V ijp ,max  V ij  V ijq ,max . 
The assumption in this paper is that the proportion of firms producing quality 
products will vary positively with the capacity of the exporting country and with the 
preference for quality of the importing country and negatively with a shock to consumers’ 
demand for quality. Thus, the level of the expected price will be a function of the quality 
thresholdc  ijqi 
1
i . According to (9), in the benchmark scenario, the value of  ij V  is the 
following: 
Vij  Vijp Vijq  
1
1Gc ij 




1G c  ij 
c
 i 1  dG c 
0
c  ij 
 
Developing this equation gives us the following value of Vij, defined over the productivity 
























    (10) 
 
with  the Pareto distribution parameter 
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Empirical procedure 
According to the definition of the expected average price, it is not possible to directly log-
linearize the equation because of the introduction of the quality threshold.  Thus it is not 
possible to obtain an estimation procedure that will allow estimating the elasticities of the 
parameters. However, I clearly identified the parameters influencing the average f.o.b price 
and the interest here is to identify the sign of these parameters. In order to derive a reduced 
form of the average price equation, I define ij V , the expected factor requirement of exporting 
firms as: 
    ij j i ij ij ij ij q c h c c h V   , , , ,    (11) 
The cut-off condition  ij c is defined over the same parameters as in the benchmark model.  
The results will now also depend on the quality threshold. I have assumed that this threshold 
would increase with the preference for quality of the importing country and with the capacity 
of the exporting country and decrease with a shock to the preference for quality idiosyncratic 
to the dyad. This allows us to define the following estimation equation: 
  ij j i ij ij j j o ij q f f y p p         , , ln ln ln 4 3 2 1        (12) 
Moreover, I define 






   and 
j e Y q j pc j
, 2 2
,
   where  i pc Y , and  j pc Y , represent 
respectively the exporting and importing country GDP per capita with the unobserved quality 
parameters represented by   
2
1 , 0
i N      and   
2
2 , 0
j N     . Thus I have  
i i pc
i




     and   j j pc y q , 2 , 2 ln      
The shock to consumers’ preference will be defined as a function of the relative number of 
custom refusals, highly correlated with import alerts. Thus I define 
ij e Sij ij
, 3 3   
  with 
 
2
3 3 , 0    N 
.   26
Thus,  ij ij ij s , 3 3 ln      . I expect  1   and 2  to be positive and  3   to be negative. The 
unobserved fixed and variable costs of trade and shock to the quality parameter are 
represented by  ij ij ij ij u u , 3 2 1      , distributed   
2 , 0   N , where 
2
   is the variance of the 
composite error. Substituting those parameters back into the log-linear expression of the 
expected f.o.b. price of exports yields the following expression: 
ij j i ij j pc i pc ij ij j i ij s y y D d p                       , 2 , 1 3 , 2 , 1 2 1 0 ln  (13) 
In what follows, I test reputation on panel data, introducing a time dimension. The average 
price equation with the introduction of time can be presented as the following:  
ij jt it ijt jt pc it pc jt ij ij j i ijt s y y y D d p                         , 2 , 1 3 , 2 , 1 2 1 0 ln (14) 
 
Our dataset allows us to test for the effect of quality and reputation on FF&V imports in the 
US.  In such a context, this equation will not work because our country fixed effects are de 
facto dyadic fixed effects given that all our exports are directed to only one region. In order to 
take care of our symmetry problem, I define a Competitiveness parameter  ij C  in analogy 
with the Attractiveness parameter used by Crozet et al (2009). This parameter collects all non 
time-dependant determinants of exports.  
ij ij ij j i ij D d C             2 1 0 ln  (15) 
Replacing in (14) yields the following estimation equation: 
jt it ijt jt pc it pc jt ij ijt s y y y C p , 2 , 1 3 , 2 , 1 ln ~ ln               (16) 
In our econometric tests,  ij C ln  corresponds to an exporter fixed effect, since the importing 
country is invariant.  
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Accounting for the export price of horticultural products 
I use the same data as in our first productivity-sorting test to which I add various data in 
order to take into consideration the exporting country’s capacity to produce quality, the 
intensity of consumers’ preference for quality in the importing country and the reputation 
parameter. In this specification, GDP per capita is a proxy for the first two parameters. I 
gathered GDP per capita data from the WDI.  
For the reputation parameter I use data compiled from FDA data on customs import 
refusals. As already discussed, refusals stand as a reasonable proxy for product reputation on 
the US market. The FDA uses its own product codification, thus refusals data had to be 
recoded in HS 6-digits. In order to test the reputation effect, I have a balanced data set 
covering 11 years, 102 products and 141 FF&V exporting countries to the US. Also, one 
might suspect that refusals are related to GDP per capita. I tested and verified this with a 
simple correlation. Table 4 shows the very small relation between refusals and GDP per 
capita. This confirms the relevance of refusals as a good proxy for reputation.  
Evidence on the importance of quality  
I first test the empirical setting (14) on the same database that I used in the productivity-
sorting test. I am not able to test the reputation effect on this database, but this benchmark 
will allow us to compare the quality and capacity parameters of this multiple importer 
database to the specific test on the US market. As already mentioned, this setting is a 
reduced forms thus I focus my attention on coefficient variations and signs rather than the 
size of the coefficient itself 
As expected, both GDPs per capita are positively related to average export f.o.b. unit 
prices as well as distance. As in the gravity as usual and productivity-sorting test, there is a 
large difference between the importer and exporter GDP per capita coefficients. But more 
surprising is the negative coefficient for importer GDP. Such results have already been   28
highlighted by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Baldwin and Harrigan (2009). The former 
highlight that the size of the market – for which GDP is usually used as a proxy – affects the 
toughness of competition to which firms will respond through a variation in their mark-ups 
and thus will affect the selection of producers and exporters into that market. This implies 
that aggregate productivity and average mark-ups respond to the size of the market and that 
mark-ups are decreasing in the number of competitors and with the export threshold of the 
market of destination. One other explanation is given by Baldwin and Harrigan (2009) with 
their “Quality Heterogeneity Firms and Trade” model. They consider that as export market 
size increases, more low quality firms will find it profitable to enter. Those low quality firms 
(here firms producing productivity products) will have a lower mill price. As a consequence, 
average f.o.b. price in larger markets will be lower. Both assumptions can well explain those 
results.  
These observations and our results are comforting regarding the ability of the model 
developed here to disentangle the effect of quality and productivity on the observed average 
export prices.  On the one hand, I observe the effect of the market size that tends to decrease 
the average export price either through more competition or on the contrary allowing for 
lower quality products to enter the market. On the other, high-income markets have a high 
preference for quality, enabling exporting firms to profitably switch to quality products.  
Reputation impact: Evidence from the US horticultural imports.  
In a second stage, I test the reputation effect on the US market. As a proxy for reputation, I 
first created a dummy variable equal to one if there has been at least one refusal for each 
exporter/product/year. As expected, average f.o.b unit prices are positively related with 
exporters’ GDP per capita and negatively related to the existence of at least one refusal. This 
confirms our hypothesis on the effect of reputation on the capacity to export quality.     
Moreover, between specification (1) and (2), I observe that the introduction of the reputation   29
parameter slightly increases the positive effect of the exporter GDP per capita on unit prices, 
thus further highlighting the impact of the capacity of the exporter to produce quality on this 
average unit export price. We could expect refusals to have a lagged influence on prices. 
Thus I tested the same equation introducing one to three years lagged refusal dummies. It also 
suppresses the impact of the co-temporality of the data and thus possible endogeneity issues. I 
observe that, apart from the one year lag, the refusal dummy coefficient is each time 
increasing.  
As an illustration of the importance of the earnestness highlighted in this paper, I 
build a set of new variables based on past refusals. The first represents the sum of years 
presenting at least one refusal in the three years prior to the observation. In a second stage I 
built another set of dummies representing the three possible values of the last variable   For 
example: for an observation in 2006, there has been at least one refusal in 2005 and in 2003, 
meaning that the dummies “one year” and “three years” will be equal to zero and the dummy 
“two year” will be equal to one. Table 6 presents the results of the same econometric 
specification using those variables for the reputation effect. The results clearly highlight the 
impact of the recurrence of refusals: the more history of refusals, the higher the negative 
impact on average export prices.  
In order to verify the reliability of the test on a refusal dummy, I first tested the 
empirical setting using the log of the number of refusals, replacing zeros in refusals by 0,001. 
Second, we could also have questioned the causality between refusals and export quantities. 
Indeed, we could consider a relationship between the probability of being inspected and the 
volumes exported. Thus I also test the empirical setting using a weighted number of refusals, 
considering an average shipment to be equal to one tone of products. This last setting has to 
be taken with caution because or risks of endogeneity due to the calculation used to obtain the 
average export price. Both results are presented in table 6. They confirm the results of the   30
specifications using refusal dummies. These results confirm our intuition of the importance of 
quality but also of reputation in the analysis of FF&V trade flows.  
 
5 Conclusion 
Following previous work on the role of productivity in explaining how producers of industrial 
goods react to exposure to international trade, this paper provides evidence that 
heterogeneous productivity-levels is also a determinant of the capacity to export horticultural 
products. The paper goes a step further by showing that quality also provides a way for 
developing countries to create the conditions for increased and more profitable market access. 
Accordingly, a negative shock on the reputation of a producer conveys a downgrading effect, 
reducing the ability for countries to export quality products.   
On a policy-oriented level, the significance of producing quality gives further credential and 
support to the current agenda of aid for trade in agriculture. Particularly, the agenda calls for 
innovative initiatives in order to support producer in complying with such standards (for 
example through the implementation of public/private partnerships). In some areas of 
Madagascar or countries of Central America, the strong involvement of the private sector in 
securing a safe and stable supply of FF&V has been decisive in the development of the sector 
and allowed for a sensible improvement of producers conditions. In Guatemala, the 
Guatemalan Exporters Association in cooperation with various domestic and international 
public institutions greatly facilitated both the development and the sustainability of 
Guatemalan’s high quality exports through capacity building, knowledge transfer and 
international visibility of the sector. However, generalization and one-size-fits all is in this 
matter a risky temptation as each country and producers’ specificities should always be taken 
into consideration.  
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7 Tables   
Table 1: Gravity as usual 
Dep var: log(Export Value)  OLS  OLS 
   (1)  (2) 
        
GDP Importer  0.379***    
   [0.0207]    
GDP Exporter  0.0964***    
   [0.0267]    
GDP per capita - Importer     0.445*** 
      [0.0213] 
GDP per Capita - Exporter     0.0994*** 
      [0.0267] 
Distance -0.510***  -0.510*** 
   [0.0158]  [0.0158] 
Contiguity 0.426***  0.427*** 
   [0.0293]  [0.0293] 
Common Language   0.165***  0.165*** 
   [0.0261]  [0.0261] 
Colony 0.0747**  0.0747** 
   [0.0314]  [0.0314] 
Constant -6.148  0.0578 
      [544.5] 
        
Observations 651,274  651,274 
R-squared 0.248  0.249 
Notes : ***, ** and * respectively indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Each regression is 




Table 2       
Correlation Importer       
log(GDP) 1     
log(GDP per Capita)  0.5739  1 
        
        
        
Correlation Exporter       
log(GDP) 1     
log(GDP per Capita)   0.6056  1 
   34
 
Table 3: Productivity sorting setting: Test on Unit Price 
Dep var: Average Unit Price  OLS  OLS 
   (1)  (2) 
        
GDP Importer  0.187***    
   [0.0151]    
GDP per capita Importer     0.238*** 
      [0.0153] 
Distance 0.101***  0.101*** 
   [0.00597]  [0.00597] 
Contiguity -0.114***  -0.113*** 
   [0.0122]  [0.0122] 
Common Language   -0.0253**  -0.0254** 
   [0.0110]  [0.0110] 
Colony 0.162***  0.162*** 
   [0.0134]  [0.0134] 
Constant -5.428  -2.379 
   [450.2]  [788.9] 
        
Observations 648,423  648,423 
R-squared 0.298  0.298 
Notes : ***, ** and * respectively indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Each regression is 
inclusive of year , product, exporter a,d importer fixed-effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
product-exporter level.   35
 
Table 4: Productivity-Quality setting: Test on Unit Price (no reputation effect) 
Dep var: Average Unit Price  OLS 
   (1) 
GDP Importer  -0.801*** 
   [0.0607] 
GDP per capita Importer  0.983*** 
   [0.0617] 
GDP per capita Exporter  0.273*** 
   [0.0340] 
Distance 0.1000*** 
   [0.00600] 
Contiguity -0.113*** 
   [0.0123] 
Common Language   -0.0269** 
   [0.0110] 
Colony 0.162*** 
   [0.0135] 
Constant 3.476*** 
   [0.906] 
     
Observations 645,001 
R-squared 0,3 
Notes : ***, ** and * respectively indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Each regression is 
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Table 5: Productivity-Quality setting with reputation effect: Test on Unit Price 
Dep var: Average Unit Price 
   OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  -7  -8 
                          
0.311*** 0.312*** 0.313***  0.314*** 0.311***  0.313*** 0.315*** 0.314***  GDP per cap 
Exporter 
[0.0729]  [0.0729] [0.0730]  [0.0730] [0.0729]  [0.0730] [0.0730] [0.0730] 
                          
   -0.0828***           -0.0688***  -0.0532**  -0.0460*  Refusal 
Dummy 
   [0.0303]           [0.0255]  [0.0246]  [0.0242] 
                          
      -0.0638**        -0.0380  -0.0164  -0.00869  Refusal 
Dummy 1 
year lag        [0.0309]        [0.0261]  [0.0251]  [0.0248] 
                          
         -0.0975***        -0.0735***  -0.0612**  Refusal 
Dummy 2 
years lag           [0.0307]        [0.0272]  [0.0262] 
                          
            -0.104***        -0.0633***  Refusal 
Dummy 3 
years lag              [0.0302]        [0.0231] 
                          
-0.257  -0.282 -0.280  -0.295 -0.276  -0.292 -0.308 -0.310  Constant 
[1.161]  [1.155] [1.157]  [1.154] [1.156]  [1.154] [1.151] [1.150] 
                          
Observations  12,909 12,909 12,909 12,909 12,909 12,909  12,909  12,909 




7  7 7 7 7 7  7  7 
Notes : ***, ** and * respectively indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Each regression is inclusive of 
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Table 6: Productivity-Quality setting with reputation effect in time: Test on Unit Price 
Dep var: Average Unit Price  OLS  OLS 
   (1)  (2) 
        
GDP per capita Exporter  0.314***  0.313*** 
   [0.0729]  [0.0730] 
Number of years with refusals the past 3 years   -0.0524***    
   [0.0166]    
Dummy: One year with refusals the past 3 years of the observation     -0.0711** 
      [0.0334] 
Dummy: Two year with refusals the past 3 years of the observation     -0.0960** 
      [0.0395] 
Dummy: Three year with refusals the past 3 years of the observation     -0.151*** 
      [0.0529] 
Constant -0.306  -0.305 
   [1.151]  [1.151] 
        
Observations 12,909  12,909 
R-squared 0.430  0.430 
Number of years (2001-2007)  7  7 
Notes : ***, ** and * respectively indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Each regression is 





Table 7       
Correlation       
log(GDP per Capita)  1    
Refusal Dummy   -0.0473  1 
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Table 8: Productivity-Quality setting with reputation effect: Test on Unit Price 
Dep var: Average Unit Price  OLS  OLS 
   (1)  (2) 
        
GDP per capita Exporter  0.241***  0.241*** 
   [0.0536]  [0.0536] 
Number of refusals   -0.00138***    
   [0.000532]    
Weighted number of refusals      -0.00118* 
      [0.000609] 
Constant -3.819***  -3.806*** 
   [0.589]  [0.589] 
        
Observations 17,813  17,813 
R-squared 0.415  0.415 
Notes : ***, ** and * respectively indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Each regression is 







8 Technical  appendix 
The benchmark model (Melitz 2003)) 
The consumer problem 
I consider a world of C  countries indexed by i, varying in size and location, in which 
consumers maximize a CES utility across a continuum of varieties over the set V available in 
country i.  
















i i dv v x U  (1) 
I assume the budget constraint of country i with the income Yi equals its expenditure and 
define Pi as the CES price index in country i.  
























i i dv v p P  
After maximization of the consumers’ utility, the demand function for the variety v takes the 
following form: 












1    (2) 
The producer problem 
As usual in the literature, the supply-side is characterized by a Dixit-Stiglitz framework of 
monopolistic competition. A single firm produces each variety and there is free entry into the 
industry. Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity in the sense that marginal cost varies 
across firms using the same technology. Firms’ productivity is distributed Pareto, with the 
distribution function   g  over   , 0   and a continuous cumulative distribution   G . 
Operating profits of a country i’s firm producing variety v  and selling to a country j  is 










Assuming a continuum of firms and a reasonable number of them allows for the 
disappearance of strategic interactions. Thus, when maximizing their profits, firms will 
charge a mill price with a constant mark-up over marginal costs: 






The country specific factor cost is denoted by wi and   / 1  c  is the firm’s specific factor 
requirement, or the inverse of its productivity, needed to produce one unit of the variety v. If 
a firm from country i seeks to sell its products to consumers in country j, those consumers 
will bear an additional transport cost  ij  defined in a Samuelson’s iceberg costs fashion:  





































) (    (5) 
A firms from country i will decide to export to country j only if   0 ) (  a ij  . Thus condition 























































Firms from country i will only be able to export to country j if their productivity is at least 
ij 1 cij    41
Aggregation 
As a result of (6)  0  ij R if and only if  ij c c  . If c0 cijonly a subset  ij N , hence 
representing ij N  varieties, of the i N  producing firms in country i will be able to export to 
country j. The productivity of those ij N  exporting firms is defined over   , ij  . Thus I can 
define the conditional distribution of     g  on    , ij   as: 
g   
1G ij 
 if   ij 
0            otherwise 
 
 
Expected average export unit f.o.b. price 
Trade data only provide with information on the average unit export f.o.b. price of products at 
the HS 6-digit level. Therefore we are looking for an expression of the expected f.o.b prices 








 ,  thus the expected average f.o.b price depends on the expected productivity 
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With   the Pareto distribution parameter and ij  the cut-off condition defined in (6). 
Accordingly the expected average f.o.b. price  ij p ~ of products exported from country i to 
country j is given by: 
 
   h    42


















    with  1    
 




























     (8) 
 